We consider an an economy where decision maker(s) do not know the true production function for a public good. By using Bayes rule they can learn from experience. We show that the economy may learn the truth, but that it may also converge to an inefficient policy where no further inference is possible so that the economy is stuck in an information trap. We also show that our results are robust with respect to experimentation UNDER CONSTRUCTION
...for after falling a few times they would in the end certainly learn to walk...
Immanuel Kant (1784) 1 Introduction
Broadly speaking, there are two theories regarding the effects of government activity on the economy.
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Some economists emphasize the crucial role of government in securing property rights, enforcing contracts, providing national security and, perhaps, guaranteeing a moderate minimum income for every one. These proponents do not deny that some government activity is better than none and they would probably argue that at a small scale, public production exhibits very large marginal productivity. These marginal products, however, then decline quickly and eventually become negative. Other economists believe that government is most productive if it operates on a large scale because of increasing returns. According to this view, operating on a small scale, the marginal product of government activity is moderate as it merely serves to appease the poor, yet fails to exhaust their full economic potential.
2
The question which of these two theories is right cannot be answered by a priory arguments.
3
However, it is crucial to know whether in the long run efficient policies are 1 See, e.g., Hayek (1944) , Hazlitt (1946) and Friedman (1962 Friedman ( , 1997 or Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) , Myrdal (1975) and Sachs (2005) .
2 This hypothesis is consistent with Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) . 3 Blendon, Benson, Brodie, Morin, Altman, Gitterman, Brossard, and James (1997) conducted an opinion survey showing that there is a substantial gap between economists' and the public's beliefs about how the economy functions. Fuchs, Blinder, and Poterba (1998) report findings from another survey that there are significant differences even among professional economists about policy questions as well as parameter estimates. This can be regarded as evidence of uncertainty about which is the correct model. Bartels (1996) notes that the " [t] he political ignorance of the American voter is one chosen, i.e., whether experience will eventually lead the economy to learn the truth. This is the question we address in this paper. For this purpose, we construct a model with uncertainty about how the economy functions. The decision maker does not know which of two possible production functions for a public good is the true one. For any given belief, the policy maker maximizes his short-run expected utility and, after observing the tax rate and the level of production of the public good, updates her beliefs using
Bayes' rule. We show that in the long run the true production function may be learned, but the economy may also converge to an inefficient policy where no further inference is possible so that the economy is stuck in an information trap. We also show that this result is robust with respect to experimentation.
The paper relates to several strands of literature. First, we investigate the correctness of Kant's optimistic view on the prospects of enlightenment, expressed in the quote above and in the following (Kant, 1784 , fourth paragraph):
4
"But that the public should enlighten itself is more likely; indeed, if it is only allowed freedom, enlightenment is almost inevitable." One of the policies adopted in the long-run equilibrium of our model is the Kantian policy. The other policy is non-Kantian in the sense that the economy is stuck in an information trap, where the truth will never be learned. Interestingly, this latter policy can be Pareto inefficient. In this respect, our paper is related to Hess and Orphanides (2001) who investigate the correctness of Kant's perpetual peace hypothesis.
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of the best-documented features of contemporary politics, but the political significance of this political ignorance is far from clear." 4 For a more modern, similarly optimistic view, see Wittman (1989) . 5 They show that Kant's conjecture that a world populated exclusively by democracies generates perpetual peace is correct insofar as perpetual peace is an equilibrium outcome if there are only democratic regimes. However, even such a world does not necessarily imply perpetual peace as there are other equilibria where wars occur with positive probability.
Second, the paper relates to the political economy literature on heterogenous social beliefs that are consistent with either multiple equilibria or long-run divergence in beliefs, such as Piketty (1995) , Spector (2000) and Alesina and Angeletos (2005) .
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In contrast to
Piketty and Spector, in our model all households share the same information and beliefs, but are eventually hindered from learning the truth.An important difference between our model and the one of Alesina and Angeletos is that their equilibria can be ranked unambiguously only from the point of view of the median household.
7
Third, our paper relates to the literature on learning. Our main finding is related to the well-known result that impatient Bayesian learners can optimally fail to learn the true parameter values (see, e.g., Easley and Kiefer, 1988) .
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In this strand of literature, the most important predecessor to our paper is McLennan (1984) who studies learning by a monopolistic seller who faces two linear demand functions intersecting at some price and who is uncertain about which of the two is true.
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The paper is also related to Laslier, Trannoy, and Van Der Straeten (2003) who study voting over unemployment 6 There is a substantial political economy literature that deals with asymmetric information where one type of player is better informed than another; see, e.g., Crawford and Sobel (1982) , Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) , Schultz (1996) or Heidhues and Lagerlöf (2003) . Schultz studies a setting where "voters, but not parties, are uncertain about the functioning of the economy". The effects of extending our model in this direction are discussed in Section 4.2. 7 Moreover, the sources of multiplicity are quite different. In their model, multiplicity stems from differences in social beliefs about which fraction of income is fair or merited, whereas in ours it arises from incomplete information and incomplete learning. 8 Insofar as incomplete learning is concerned, a very similar phenomenon obtains in models of herding such as Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) . However, the reasons for incomplete learning are very different in the two types of models. 9 In every period, the seller in McLennan's model observes whether there is sale or not and updates his beliefs accordingly. Among other things he shows that with positive probability the seller ends up charging the price where the two demand functions intersect, at which point no further learning is possible. A more detailed discussion of the relationship between our model and McLennan's is deferred to the end of section 3.
benefits when households do not know the (a fortiori unobserved) distribution of skills of the unemployed. They uncover a possibility of inefficiency that is quite similar to our
finding. An important contrast is that in our model the dynamics are not monotone.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model.
Section 3 analyzes the dynamic learning process. Section 4 extends the model by introducing experimentation by the policy maker. Section 5 concludes. All the proofs are in the Appendix.
The model
There is a continuum of individuals whose total mass is normalized to one. Individual We assume that H(g) is twice differentiable, strictly concave and increasing in g for g close to zero. This assumption makes sure that for every household there is a unique bliss 10 The dynamics of our model are more similar to those in Baron (1996) , who analyzes voting over public goods programs by a legislature when there is uncertainty about which legislators can make proposals in future periods. As in our model, the economy "hops" towards its absorbing state, which in his model is given by the complete information bliss point of the median voter. In contrast to Baron Persson and Tabellini (2000, ch. 3) which would yield the median voter equilibrium where both parties choose the tax rate the maximizes the median income household's utility. Second, our learning results also hold if the decision maker chooses a different tax policy. For example, he could choose a tax rate that maximizes the income of the 40th percentile or the 55th percentile. In this sense our approach is more general than a focus on a median voter model.
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In particular, in Section 4 we show that our results
In a previous version of the paper we also modelled electoral competition. We are thankful to the editor to point out that our stylized Downsian model limited the scope of our results.
hold when the decision maker chooses a random tax policy.
We now introduce two production functions H A (τ ) and H B (τ ) satisfying the assumptions made above. These are supposed to represent the two distinct, commonly held views on the effect of government activity on the economy described above. The decision maker has the initial belief α 1 that the production function H A is the true one, with The production function representing the view that the optimal size of government is small has a shape like H A in the bottom panels in Figure 1 . It is very steep when τ is close to zero, but then flattens quickly and eventually decreases in τ . The production function reflecting the view that government is most efficient if large has a shape similar to H B in the bottom panels in Figure 1 , which is not very steep at the origin but flattens much slower than H A . If our sketch of these two opposing views is correct, then the two functions H A and H B will have to intersect at some point, which we denote byτ .
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The production of the public good is exposed to uncertainty. If τ t is the tax rate in period t, then the decision maker observes the outcome
where ε t is an error term drawn randomly in every period. This error term ε t captures factors influencing the policy outcome except the policy itself. The error terms are normally and independently distributed with mean 0 and variance σ 2 ; we denote its probability density function by φ(ε t ).
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Note that without noise, the learning process,
12 Conceptionally,τ corresponds to the price in McLennan (1984) where the demand functions intersect. 13 The normality assumption is only sufficient. As becomes clear from the proof of Proposition 2, all our results will hold for any distribution f (ε t ) that have full support and whose likelihood ratio
is monotone in ε t and takes on values from zero to infinity.
described below, would be degenerate since one observation would be sufficient to identify the true production function.
In period t + 1, the entire history
of previously implemented tax rates and associated policy outcomes is known to the decision maker. Since his belief in period t that H A is the true is α t , the expected level of the public good in period t for tax rate τ t is
3 Dynamics and long-run equilibria
We now derive the long-run equilibrium in our model. We assume that in every period t the decision maker maximizes myopically the expected utility of the median households
. This assumption is a good approximation if periods are long compared to the patience of households. The learning problem we explore captures the decision problem of a decision maker who faces uncertainty about which of two models of reality is the correct one and whose actions affect both his current period payoff and his future beliefs. The decision maker can be the government of a country, like a (benevolent or malevolent) dictator or a democratically elected president or a monopolistic seller who faces intersecting demand functions.
14 .
Proposition 1 characterizes the decision maker's optimal policy. materializes. If ε 1 > 0, the outcome is better than expected under H 1 , and therefore, the updated belief is α 2 > α 1 and the new expected production function H 2 is as shown in the left hand panel. On the other hand, if ε 1 < 0, the outcome is worse than expected under H 1 , and therefore α 2 < α 1 yielding H 2 as shown in the right hand panel. In both cases, the expected production function H 2 is the basis for equilibrium in period 2. 
An informal discussion
The decision maker's problem is a problem of inference. Recall that
is the history up to date t. Accordingly, let Pr(H A H t ) denote the conditional probability that H A is true given history H t . Denote by Pr(h t H A , τ t ) the probability of observing h t given that H A is true and given that policy τ t is implemented. Then, by Bayes rule
Since households are rational, they use Bayes rules (3) to update their beliefs, i.e., α t+1 = Pr(H A |H t ). Since the probability of observing h t is higher under the true production function H A than under H B , α t+1 should be expected to converge to one as the number of observations gets large. However, recall that the two production functions intersect atτ which implies that Pr(h t |H A ,τ ) = Pr(h t |H B ,τ ). Inspection of (3) 
Clearly,α ∈ (0, 1) exists and is unique.
The information trap
We now state our main result: The content of Proposition 2 is that the policy converges to a random variable whose support isτ and τ m A . This is equivalent to saying that the process of beliefs converges to a random variable whose support consists solely ofα and 1. The result in Proposition 2 is similar to the finding of Hess and Orphanides (2001) : What Kant conjecturedenlightenment being inevitable in our case, perpetual peace in their case -is indeed an equilibrium outcome, but it is not the only equilibrium outcome.
The reason why there is a range aroundτ from which the policy can eventually not escape is that the two production functions have very similar values in the neighborhood ofτ . The closer one gets toτ , the less distinguishable the true and the false production function become. Once one is close enough toτ , it thus becomes very difficult to learn anything. Hence, the economy becomes stuck with its current beliefs once these are sufficiently close toα, as a consequence of which policy will not change anymore. Hence, one can speak of an information trap aroundτ . 
The efficiency potential
Next we present an analytical result for the lower bound of the probability that the policy converges to τ m A . For that purpose, we define the efficiency potential as this minimal probability, which we denote as ξ. That is, ξ ≡ inf Pr (lim t→∞ τ t → τ < 0 is also intuitive, but understanding it requires a moment's reflection. For a given α 1 >α, a series of bad shocks is required for the beliefs to be downgraded toα. Obviously, asα decreases, a longer series of bad shocks is required for beliefs to be downgraded toα. Since a longer series of bad shocks is less likely, the efficiency potential increases asα decreases.
McLennan's model
As metioned in the introduction our model of learning is closely related to McLennan (1984) . Let us therefore discuss the similarities and differences. The two models are very similar in that both assume that there is a policy (τ in our model, a in McLennan's;
for simplicity, we discuss both models using our notation) that, once taken, will inhibit any further inference. The main difference between the two resides in the nature of the random variable, which is binary (sale, no sale) in McLennan's and continuous in our model. The simpler structure allows McLennan to derive the result that under certain restrictions the seller's belief α never jumps overα. That is, if he starts with α 1 <α, his long run belief α ∞ will be either 0 orα and if he starts with α 1 >α it will be either α or 1. No such result obtains in our model because for any given α t ∈ (0,α) there is always a positive probability that a shock occurs such that α t+1 >α. Since p 0 (α),p(α) and p 1 (α) are probabilities and because all paths converge,
Then because of the elementary property of Bayesian updating that the expected posterior is equal to the prior,
In contrast to McLennan, who has the additional restriction that for, say, α <α the only absorbing states are {0,α}, the system of the two equations (4) and (5) 
Numerical results
The distribution of the long-run beliefs α ∞ cannot be calculated explicitly. We therefore have to rely on simulations in order to approximate the probability that beliefs converge 16 To see this, observe that α t+1 (ε t ) = α t
αt+(1−αt)l(εt)
, where l(ε t ) is the likelihood ratio that as a function of the shock ε t can take any value between zero and infinity. Consequently, α t+1 is a random variable with support (0, 1).
to α ∞ =α and α ∞ = 1, respectively. Our simulations suggest that convergence toτ occurs for a wide range of initial conditions. This is of particular interest becauseτ can be Pareto inefficient (Corollary 1).
The simulation results are collected in the two tables below for two different constellations of production functions. Tables 1 and 2. the belief converged to 1 for a given combination of initial belief α 1 and noise σ. For every entry we did a hundred draws. One minus the table entry gives the share of draws that converged to the inefficient tax rate.
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For example, the 1 in the top left entry of Table 1 means that for α 1 = 0.1 and σ = 0.2 every draw converged to 1, for the blue (true) and green (untrue) production function. Note that the smaller σ, the higher the probability of reaching τ increases the informativeness of the policy outcome.
Three further remarks are in order. First, the efficiency potential ξ has some bite indeed. For σ = 2, ξ is quite close to the numerical results both in Table 1 and 2. Thus, ξ is not a merely theoretical lower bound. Second, the difference between the numerical results and the efficiency potential for σ = 2 and α 1 = 0.5 in Table 1 and for α 1 = 0.8 in Table 2 is not statistically significant.
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Third, consider the columns for σ = 1 in Table   1 and σ = 0.5 in Table 2 to see that the probability of convergence to the good policy does not increase monotonically in the initial belief α 1 .
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The intuition for this behavior seems to be that starting from very bad initial beliefs, i.e. α 1 close to zero, increases in α 1 may well increase the likelihood of adopting a good policy in the long-run. However, as α 1 becomes larger it gets closer toα and thereby increases the probability of adopting a bad policy in the long-run. Witness in particular that the minima in these columns are reached for the α 1 closest to, and to the left of,α, which are, respectively, α 1 = 0.4
and α 1 = 0.5.
Experimentation
There are many directions in which our model can be extended. Here, we consider experimentation which is particularly relevant. There are two reasons for doing so. Table 1 , the probability decreases from 0.26 (0.04) to 0.21 (0.04), while in Table 2 it decreases from 0.36 (0.05) to 0.21 (0.04), where standard errors are in parentheses. Thus, the difference between 0.36 and 0.21 in Table 2 is statistically significant whereas the difference between 0.26 and 0.21 in Table  1 is not.
maker is not choosing the tax rate which is optimal for the median household. Second, so far we have assumed that the decision maker behaves myopically. This is in particular questionable if the economy is stuck in the information trap since the decision maker knows that reachingτ is bad : it prevents learning with probability one. It is thus of particular relevance to check whether the result that the economy may end up in an information trap breaks down when we endow the decision maker with some forward looking ability. We do this by allowing him do experiments.
A plausible, and feasible, way of modelling foresighted and experimenting behavior is the following. In any period t, let the decision maker choose τ 
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The larger ∆, the greater the degree of foresightedness and/or the larger the willingness to experiment.
The question that interests us is whether in the long-run beliefs converge towards α ∞ =α with positive probability. To answer this question, we use again simulations.
The results are collected in Table 3 . The true production function H A and the alternative H G are the same as in Table 1 above. We set σ = 1 and let α 1 increase from 0.1 to 0.9, while ∆ increases from 0.00001 to 0.1. (The first column with ∆ = 0 is a reprint from Table 1 .) For each pair (α 1 , ∆), we ran 100 draws. Table entries give the number of draws for which the process ended with beliefs α ∞ = 1. In this case, the good policy τ The assumption that randomization is fifty-fifty is made for convenience. We expect the results to be robust to other distributions as long as these are not too skewed towards the true production function.
is implemented in the long run. We observe the following. First, if ∆ is sufficiently large, in particular larger than 0.1, then the truth is always learnt in the long-run. Note that ∆ = 0.1 implies a difference between the policy platforms of 10 percentage points. Even with ∆ = 0.01, convergence to the Pareto efficient policy is still almost universal. However, as ∆ becomes smaller, the probability of convergence to α ∞ = 1 decreases, too. For example, for ∆ = 0.0001 and α 1 ≤ 0.4, less than 70 out of the 100 draws converged to α ∞ = 1. Of course, ∆ = 0.0001 corresponds to one percent of a percent and is thus admittedly a very small policy difference. Nonetheless, it represents a positive amount of experimentation and reflects at least some degree of forward looking behavior. Hence, we conclude that our information trap result does not break down 'as soon as even the slightest degree of nonmyopic behavior or experimentation is allowed for', as one reader conjectured. Second, consider the column with ∆ = 0.0001 to see that the non-monotonicity in α 1 observed above carries over to the model with experimentation.
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Conclusions
We consider an economy where there is uncertainty about how the economy functions.
In every period, the decision maker implements a policy. Observations of policies and economic outcomes are used to update the decision makers beliefs, which then serve as the basis for decision making in the following period. We show that the economy can end up in an information trap where no further learning is possible. This result is robust with respect to the introduction of experimentation. Putnam (1993) has raised the question why some governments fail and others succeed. He explains the failure and success of democracies by referring to differences in political institutions and attitudes. We have provided an alternative explanation why initially identical societies may differ in the long run and more specifically, why some countries may adopt Pareto inferior policies even in the long run. Our explanation is that decision makers face uncertainty and that uncertainty can only be unravelled by experience. Initially identical countries may end up with different outcomes because in combination with bad luck the equilibrium may impede further inferences, so that the uncertainty is never abolished.
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Since in our model economies may fail to converge to 23 Though the ∆'s for which non-convergence to τ m A is obtained appear rather small, it should be noted that the size of ∆ is only meaningful in relation to the slopes of H A and H B in the neighborhood ofτ : The smaller the difference in these slopes, the larger ∆ can be for non-convergence to occur with positive probability. An example is available upon request/in the Webappendix.
24 Among other things, we have shown that initial beliefs may be crucial for the long run political outcome. This may help better understand the economic and political difficulties former colonies face who may have been endowed with bad initial beliefs at the time of independence, as emphasized, e.g.,
Pareto efficient policies as a consequence of bad shocks, its predictions are consistent with the observations of Easterly (2001) 
Consequently, the optimal tax rate of the voter with the median income is the median optimal tax rate. In any period t the median household's optimal tax rate under the expected production function H t (τ t ) defined in (2) by Bauer (1981) . 25 See, e.g., Hogg and Craig (1995) .
We first define the function
. The fact that 
< 0, since −s > 0 and α t H A + (1 − α t )H B < 0 by concavity. This is also quite intuitive. As the beliefs that H A is true increase, the equilibrium tax rate decreases, i.e., is closer to τ Let α 1 = Pr(H A ) and 1 − α 1 = Pr(H B ) be the exogenously given prior beliefs that H A and H B are true, respectively, and let
be the respective probabilities of observing h t when H A and when H B is true, where φ(.) is the density of the normal with mean zero and variance σ 2 .
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After history H t = 26 Note that for a continuous random variable any single observation has probability zero. Nonetheless, L'Hôpital's rule can be used to determine to posterior probability, so that the density rather than the cdf is appropriate.
, the period t + 1 belief can be written as
Define
such that (6) becomes
. This defines the function α t = α(N t ) with
Moreover, we can now define a sequence of random variables
, the initial value of which is exogenously given as 
, there is a uniqueÑ such that r(Ñ ) = 0. In light of these new definitions,
Notice that (8) is a non-linear stochastic first-order difference equation.
Observe first that if the sequence takes either the value 0 or the valueÑ , it will take this value forever. This becomes immediate for N t = 0 by inserting N t = 0 into (8). For
is infinity, N t+1 will be too, since lim N t →∞ r(N t ) is a finite negative number.
Note also that the sequence {N t } is a martingale. The reason is first that
The martingale convergence theorem (e.g., Durrett, 2005, p. 233) Proof. From the observation we made above, we know that Pr(N t+1 = 0|N t = 0) = 1 and Pr(N t+1 =Ñ |N t =Ñ ) = 1. We now prove by contradiction that there exists no other value C the martingale N t can converge to. Note that the martingale convergence theorem directly states that N t cannot converge to infinity.
Assume there exists a number C ∈ (0, ∞) where N t can converge to. Then, for every δ ∈ IR such that 0 ∈ [C − δ, C + δ] andÑ ∈ [C − δ, C + δ], there exists a time period t δ , for which we have N t δ +i ∈ [C − δ, C + δ] for i = 0, 1, ... . Note that δ can be chosen arbitrarily small. Now define the variable ε t δ +i by
Note that ε t δ +i is a shock such that N t δ +i+1 = C + δ. Assume that C <Ñ . Then, the variable ε t δ +i is negative and finite for all N t δ +i ∈ [C − δ, C + δ], because all terms in (9) are finite. Therefore, for every N t δ +i ∈ [C − δ, C + δ], Pr(ε t δ +i < ε t δ +i ) = Φ(ε t δ +i ) > 0, which means that the probability to draw an ε t δ +i < ε t δ +i is strictly positive for every
. Thus, with a positive probability we observe an N t δ +i+1 > C + δ for every period t δ + i because N t δ +i+1 depends negatively on ε t δ +i . This means, that inf N t δ +i ∈ [C−δ,C+δ] Pr(N t δ +i+1 ∈ [C − δ, C + δ]) > 0 , which is a contradiction to the assumption of convergence of N t . Hence, N t cannot converge to C.
In order to prove non-convergence towards a C >Ñ , we define ε t δ +i as ε t δ +i ≡ σ 2 r(N t δ +i ) · ln
r(N t δ +i ) and use the equivalent reasoning as above.
We are now only left to show that the probability of N t converging to the set union of all C is still 0. By choosing intervals around C with rational endpoints, the probabilities can be summed up for the union set. Since we can choose δ arbitrarily, it is always possible to find an interval with rational endpoints for all C. Therefore, the sum of probabilities over these intervals is 0. This completes the proof of Lemma 1. Consequently, the functions ω(α t ) and r(N t ) defined in the proof of Proposition 2 will also be non-zero in the relevant range. Therefore, equation (8) has a unique fixed point, which is N t+1 = N t = 0, corresponding to α t+1 = α t = 1.
Proof of Proposition 3
From Proposition 2 we know that α t either converges to 1 or toα. What we need to characterize in order to prove Proposition 3 is actually the distribution of the random variable N ∞ over {0,Ñ }, from which we can then deduce the distribution of the random variable α ∞ over {1,α}. Corollary 2.11 in Durrett (2005) implies As it is a probability, ξ must be nonnegative. It equals the minimum value of (1 − µ) if .
